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RECENT CHANGES IN GERMANY'S FOREIGN TRADE BALANCE
In the spring of 1951 an export surplus in the
foreign trade of the Federal Republic of Germany
replaced the excess of imports which had persisted
since the end of the war and grown particularly
large in the months following the outbreak of hos-
tilities in Korea. Most of the change was in Ger-
many's trade balance with other Western European
countries. It was connected with changes in prices
on world markets, in domestic consumer demand,
and in the attitude of German producers and
merchants towards the accumulation of inventories.
The domestic factors were influenced by monetary
and commercial measures taken by the Central
Bank Board and the Federal Government.
The postwar recovery of western Germany's
foreign trade did not get under way until the middle
of 1948. In the three preceding years, German ex-
ports included only small shipments of coal and
timber, and imports consisted mainly of the most
urgently needed foodstuffs, financed by the United
States and the United Kingdom in order to prevent
the spread of disease and unrest. Recovery was
hampered by the division of the country into four
zones of occupation, and by the repressed inflation
which impaired the working of the monetary
mechanism and made it necessary to retain the
direct economic controls established under the Nazi
regime.
In 1948 the authorities succeeded in establishing
a new currency system. In the western zones of
occupation, many economic controls were abolished
and others relaxed. The reunification of western
Germany, which had been started in December 1946
by the economic merger of the American and Brit-
ish zones, made greater progress. Under the Euro-
pean Recovery Program the emphasis of foreign
assistance was changed from relief to reconstruction.
Western Germany became a member of the Organi-
zation for European Economic Cooperation, and
later of the European Payments Union. Super-
vision of foreign trade was gradually entrusted to
the German authorities, and in the fall of 1949 the
Government of the newly established Federal Re-
1This article was prepared by Gordon B. Grim wood under
the supervision of J. Herbert Furth, Chief of the Central and
Eastern European Section of the Board's Division of Inter-
national Finance.
public of Germany assumed almost full economic
responsibility.
The economy of the Federal Republic, like that
of the former German Reich, depends upon im-
ported raw materials and foodstuffs. In fact, foreign
trade is even more important to the Federal Repub-
lic than it was to the former Reich. In 1936 the
area now within the Federal Republic sold 30 per
cent more goods to the eastern parts of the former
Reich (including Berlin) than it exported to foreign
countries, and imported 50 per cent more from
eastern Germany than from foreign countries.
After the Soviet occupation of eastern Germany
in 1945, this trade between western and eastern
Germany dwindled until in 1950 it was less than
5 per cent of the prewar volume.
It was possible for the Federal Republic to estab-
lish new plants and to replace a portion of the
manufactured products formerly obtained from the
eastern part of the Reich, but domestic substitutes
for most raw materials and foodstuffs were unavail-
able. These essential commodities represented about
half of the prewar purchases of the western part of
the Reich from the eastern part. The Federal Re-
public also had to readjust and to expand its exports,
since western German industries that formerly sold
a large part of their output in eastern Germany
had to find new markets.
The foreign trade of the Federal Republic also
was affected by postwar changes in Eastern Europe,
which accounted in 1936 for approximately 20 per
cent of western Germany's foreign trade. This
area was the source of numerous raw materials and
foodstuffs imported by Germany and the market
for many types of industrial products exported by
Germany. The postwar policy of regional self-
sufficiency in Soviet Europe cut that trade until in
1950 it amounted to only 5 per cent of the foreign
trade of the Federal Republic.
To the middle of 1950, increased trade with the
rest of the world had not fully compensated for this
sharp decline in the Federal Republic's trade with
Eastern Europe (even excluding prewar trade with
the eastern area of the former Reich). This was
particularly true of exports, which in the second
quarter of 1950 were still 25 per cent below the 1936
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value of western German exports to foreign coun-
tries (at 1950 prices). Imports were within about
10 per cent of the 1936 figure and exceeded exports
by 105 million dollars, exactly the amount of foreign
aid received under the European Recovery Program
and the United States Army program of relief in
occupied areas.
INCREASE IN TRADE DEFICIT IN LAST HALF OF 1950
The immediate effect of the outbreak of hostili-
ties in Korea on western Germany's international
position was a 120 million dollar increase in the
trade deficit between the second and the fourth




Source.—Der Aussenhandel der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,
December 1951.
tors largely explain this increase: changes in the
relation of import and export prices, accumulation
of inventories, increased importation of manufac-
tured consumers' goods, and—on the financial side
—expansion of credit.
Changes in import and export prices. Germany,
along with other industrial nations that export
mainly manufactured products and import mainly
foodstuffs and industrial raw materials, was affected
by price changes on world markets after the out-
break of hostilities in Korea. Manufacturers and
dealers were anxious to accumulate inventories, and
world demand became more urgent for industrial
raw materials than for finished products. The sup-
ply of raw materials could not be rapidly increased,
and their prices rose faster than the prices of fin-
ished products.
During 1950 the German Central Statistical Office
completed a new index of the physical volume of
foreign trade derived by expressing all value figures
in 1950 prices. According to this index, as shown
in the table on page 241, exports rose by 257 mil-
lion dollars and imports by 312 million between the
second and the fourth quarter of 1950, accounting
for approximately 55 million dollars of a total in-
crease in deficit that amounted to 120 million.
About 65 million dollars of the increase was thus
due to the changed relation between import and
export prices.
Accumulation of inventories. Prospects of rapid
rearmament of the free world after the outbreak
of the Korean war gave rise to a 33 per cent expan-
sion in the output of finished producers' goods in
Germany between the second and the fourth quarter
of 1950. Increased employment in heavy industry,
accompanied by a rise in consumer demand brought
on by the general feeling of uncertainty, stimulated
a rise in the output of consumers' goods by 26 per
cent. The over-all index of industrial production
(excluding construction and food processing) rose
by 23 per cent, as shown in the table below, and this
increase in production brought about an increase
in the volume of producers' imports.
The import volume of raw materials and semi-
finished goods increased far more rapidly than in-
dustrial production in the second half of 1950, as
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1 Excluding building and food processing.
2 Raw materials and semifinished products at 1950 prices.
3 Foodstuffs and finished manufactured products at 1950 prices .
Source.—Production: Monthly Report of the Bank deutscher
Laender, December 1951. Imports: Der Aussenhandel der Bundes-
republik Deutschland, December 1951.
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shown in the table. This would seem to indicate
that some industrial imports were being accumu-
lated in inventories. Data on raw material stocks
are fragmentary and inconclusive on this point, but
it is known that producers in Germany, as in most
other industrial countries, were at that time expect-
ing shortages, or at least a further rise in raw mate-
rial prices, and were therefore anxious to purchase
large quantities of materials regardless of imme-
diate needs.
Rise in consumers' imports. Although the volume
of purchasing power in the hands of the public
increased greatly during the period under review,
increased imports of finished consumers' goods were
not a major factor in the rising trade deficit. In-
dustrial payrolls, as shown in the chart below,
increased by 21 per cent between the second
and the fourth quarter of 1950, and consumers
spent a larger proportion of their increased money
incomes. Increased consumer demand was largely
met by a rapid increase in the domestic production
of consumers' goods, which in turn was reflected
in the rise of producers' imports. Increased imports
of finished manufactured products were only a
SELECTED BUSINESS INDEXES
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
Per Cent Q uarterly 1950 - 100 PerCenf
1950 1951 1950 1951
NOTE.—Indexes represent quarterly averages; the production
index for fourth quarter 1951 is preliminary. Sales of invest-
ment goods are represented by sales of products of the metal
and machine industries; sales of consumers' goods by sales
of the textile and clothing industries. Prices of primary prod-
ucts are prices paid in Germany for products of the basic
industries. Payroll data for fourth quarter are estimated.
Sources.—Production and prices: Monthly Report of the Bank
deutscher Laender, December 1951. Wages and sales: IVirt-
schaft und Statistik, August 1951 and subsequent issues.
small fraction of the rise in total imports. Imports
of foodstuffs changed only seasonally.
Expansion of credit. The persistent weakness of
the capital market in western Germany, together
with a chronic shortage of working capital, caused
German industry to depend greatly on short-term
GERMAN MONETARY STATISTICS



























































































1 Deutsche mark = $0,238. Figures rounded to nearest 0.1
billion.
2 Notes and currency in circulation outside banks.
3 Sight and time deposits of business firms and individuals in
commercial banks.
4 In commercial banks only.
5 Credits of six months or less by commercial banks to business
firms and individuals.
6 Credits longer than six months by commercial banks to busi-
nesses and individuals.
Source.—Monthly Report of the Bank deutscher Laender, January
1952.
credit. Between June and December 1950, short-
term bank loans to business firms and individuals
rose by 2.4 billion marks or about 570 million dol-
lars; according to the estimate of the Bank deutscher
Laender more than one-fifth of this amount was
used directly for financing the increased volume of
imports. This credit expansion was partly offset
by a reduction of 0.3 billion marks in short-term
credits to public authorities. As shown in the
table, the money supply (currency outside banks
plus private sight and time deposits) increased by
2.1 billion marks or about 500 million dollars dur-
ing the same period.
PAYMENTS CRISIS AND CORRECTIVE ACTION
The inauguration of the European Payments
Union on July 1, 1950 resulted in a shift in imports
from the dollar area to Western Europe. Germany,
like other participating countries, received a sub-
stantial line of credit for imports from other West-
ern European nations. Moreover, in accordance
with the program of intra-European trade liberali-
zation, 60 per cent of Germany's imports from the
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Union had been freed from quota restrictions. The
rise in Germany's trade deficit with other members
of the Union was therefore particularly sharp.
The balance of current payments with the Union
area showed an even larger deficit than did the bal-
ance of trade, as shown in the chart. This move-
ment was largely the result of speculative activities.
Pessimism as to the future of the German mark
developed, and its influence was aggravated by
rumors of an impending appreciation of sterling.
In consequence, German importers tended to pre-
pay shipments and German exporters to extend
credit beyond the usual periods.






























NOTE.—Balances of trade and payments are quarterly totals.
Cumulative figures are as of end of quarter and exclude capital
movements and bank balances not cleared through EPU, both
of which are included in the balance-of-payments figures.
Source.—Monthly Report of the Bank deutscher Laender,
December 1951.
By November 1950, only four months after the
start of the European Payments Union, the Federal
Republic had approached the limits of its credit
quota and had seriously depleted its dollar exchange
holdings in order to meet the increasing payments
required under the Union schedule. To assist in
the maintenance of the German program of trade
liberalization, the Union on December 13, 1950
granted Germany a special additional line of credit
up to 120 million dollars, which was to be repaid
over a period of six months beginning in May 1951.
As this payments crisis developed, the Central
Bank Board moved to dampen the demand for im-
ports by tightening the general supply of credit. In
October 1950 reserve requirements and the redis-
count rate were raised, and the Land Central Banks
were directed to hold the volume of acceptance
credits in their portfolios within the amounts out-
standing on October 12, 1950. At the same time
the German Government required importers seek-
ing licenses to deposit in cash 50 per cent of the
value of the imports.
These measures did not stop the expansion of
short-term credit, as shown in the table on page
239. The continued expansion of short-term loans
was made possible largely by central bank credits
to commercial banks, which in February 1951
reached a record level 47 per cent higher than in
June and 11 per cent higher than in October 1950.
The money supply, under pressure of seasonal tax
payments and continued heavy purchases of for-
eign exchange from the central banking system,
contracted slightly during the first two months of
1951. Nevertheless, wholesale prices rose as much
in these two months as in the preceding six months
and the cost of living, which until that time had
remained stable, started to move upward (see chart
on page 239).
Germany's international trade and payments posi-
tion did not significantly improve in the first two
months of 1951. The over-all trade deficit and the
EPU payments deficit were only slightly below the
monthly average of the fourth quarter of 1950.
The German authorities took two drastic steps
at the end of February: the Central Bank Board
ordered the commercial banks to reduce the volume
of short-term credit outstanding by 1 billion marks,
and the German Government temporarily sus-
pended the program of trade liberalization. On
February 22, 1951, with the consent of the Euro-
pean Payments Union, Germany reapplied the sys-
tem of licensing all imports from the other Union
members. At the same time all licenses that were
outstanding but not supported by contracts were
canceled, and holders of licenses supported by con-
tracts payable before May 1, 1951 were required
to obtain special licenses. In this way the authori-
ties regained control over the entire volume of im-
ports.
EMERGENCE OF EXPORT SURPLUS AFTER MID-1951
Following the imposition of import restrictions
and the tightening of credit, Germany's balance of
trade changed sharply. Total exports continued
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to increase until June 1951, after which they re-
mained nearly twice as large as the quarterly aver-
age for 1950. Total imports, on the other hand,
dropped by about 15 per cent between the first and
the second quarter of 1951. Their rise after June
1951 to a level slightly higher than in the winter
of 1950-51 was not sufficient to prevent an export
surplus, as shown in the table below and the chart
on page 238.
Correction for price changes alter the foreign
trade picture only slightly. Exports rose less rapidly
in physical volume than in value at current prices.
Imports fluctuated more extensively in volume than
in value, but their volume remained below the
peak reached during the last quarter of 1950.
VOLUME AND VALUE OF GERMANY'S FOREIGN TRADE






















































1 Deutsche mark figures at 1950 prices converted into dollars at
official exchange rate.
2 At current prices.
Source.—Der Aussenhandel der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,
December 1951.
Reversal of the trends in prices and in inventory
accumulation, which had been major factors in the
large excess of imports in the winter of 1950-51,
helped to bring about the subsequent reversal of
Germany's international trade position. The effects
of these factors were augmented by the monetary
policies of the central banking system and the direct
import controls imposed by the German Govern-
ment.
Reversal of price trends. After the second quarter
of 1951 the ratio of export prices to import prices
moved slowly in favor of Germany: prices of most
industrial raw materials dropped on international
markets while prices of manufactured products re-
mained stable or continued to rise. Comparison of
the balance of trade which would have been
achieved had prices remained at the first-quarter
level with the actual trade position indicates that
price changes had little effect during the second and
third quarters, but accounted for almost all of Ger-
many's export surplus in the fourth quarter of
1951.
Decline in inventory accumulation. Industrial pro-
duction stopped rising in April 1951, declined from
May until August, and advanced during the re-
mainder of year. It was not until the last quarter,
however, that production surpassed the spring level.
The largest drop in production and the slowest
recovery occurred in consumers' goods.
The ratio of imports of producers' goods to indus-
trial production declined considerably from the high
level of the fourth quarter of 1950, as shown by
the table on page 238. This fact indicates that in-
ventories accumulated during the winter of 1950-51
were being used during the last nine months of 1951.
The change in producers' attitudes toward the
accumulation of inventories may be explained, apart
from the credit restrictions discussed below, by the
greater uncertainty as to future increases in output
and sales and by the decline in raw material prices
on world markets.
Decline in consumers' imports. Changes in con-
sumers' goods imports, which had played only a
minor role in the increased trade deficit in the
winter of 1950-51, played an equally small part in
the subsequent elimination of the deficit. They
declined only slightly from the record level reached
in the fourth quarter of 1950, and the greater part
of the change was attributable to seasonal varia-
tions in food shipments.
Restrictive credit policies. After the Central Bank
Board issued its credit directives in February, the
commercial banks curtailed the volume of short-
term credit to business and individual borrowers
from 13.5 billion marks on February 28 to 12.5
billion on May 31, 1951. After May the volume
of credit expanded again, but at a somewhat slower
rate than in 1950 (see table on page 239).
The money supply, after leveling in the first
quarter, resumed expansion in the second quarter
of 1951. In contrast to previous periods, however,
this expansion was largely based on net sales of
foreign exchange to the central banking system
rather than exclusively on the extension of short-
term credit by the commercial banks.
The contraction of credit in March and April
1951 probably strengthened the tendency of manu-
facturers and wholesalers to reduce inventories.
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At the same time the restrictive credit policies,
together with achievement of equilibrium in the
Government budget, helped to maintain public con-
fidence in the currency and thus to prevent a resur-
gence of the buying wave which had occurred in
the winter of 1950-51. Credit restrictions thus
helped to prevent a rapid rise in domestic prices
once the prices of imported raw materials stopped
rising, and so to maintain the competitive position
of German producers in foreign as well as domestic
markets. In the eight months following April 1951
wholesale prices and the cost of living rose by only
2 and 4 per cent, respectively, as shown in the chart
on page 239.
Credit expansion in the winter of 1950-51 and
net purchases of foreign exchange from the central
banking system to finance the excess of imports
reduced the liquidity of the commercial banks and
increased the effectiveness of the credit controls
applied in February 1951. In contrast, net sales
of foreign exchange to the central banking system
after March 1951, when export surpluses prevailed,
gradually increased the liquidity of the banks and
enabled them to expand credit to finance imports
without recourse to borrowing from the central
banking system. In October 1951 the central bank-
ing system curbed the increase in liquidity by selling
commercial banks a substantial portion of its port-
folio of short-term Treasury paper. This was the
first attempt by the central banking authorities to
reduce commercial bank liquidity by the sale of
securities. The weakness of the German capital
market has thus far precluded the issue of long-
term Government bonds which might have been
used for open market operations.
Import restrictions. The direct controls imposed
in February 1951 on German imports from Western
Europe probably were responsible for the speed with
which Germany's international trade and payments
position changed after March, but it may be ques-
tioned whether they did more than accentuate a
development that had its main roots in other eco-
nomic changes.
Germany's export surplus was due more to in-
creased exports than to reduced imports, as shown
in the table on page 241 and chart on page 238.
The fact that exports were 75 per cent larger in
1951 than in 1950 cannot be attributed to import
restrictions. Moreover, the reduction in imports
was not much greater than the reduction in do-
mestic sales of German industrial products, except
in the second quarter of 1951. In the two largest
consumers' goods industries, textiles and clothing,
the value of domestic sales, adjusted for price
changes, declined by 7 per cent between the first
and the third quarter of 1951. In the same period
total imports, similarly adjusted, declined by 9
per cent.
Only in the second quarter of 1951 were imports
appreciably below a level that could be satisfactorily
explained by domestic developments. Neither this
fact nor the sudden change from a deficit to a sur-
plus in trade with many members of the European
Payments Union could be explained by market fac-
tors alone. Import controls thus appear to have
influenced the improvement in Germany's foreign
trade position primarily by their immediate impact
in the second quarter of 1951.
Improvement in EPU position. The combination
of expanded exports and contracted imports changed
Germany's position with the European Payments
Union, as shown by the chart on page 240. An
export surplus was achieved in March and increased
during the remainder of the year; the balance of
payments, partly because of a reversal of the specula-
tive factors which had worked against Germany
during the winter of 1950-51, showed a larger sur-
plus than the balance of trade by the third quarter
of 1951. The special credit granted by EPU, upon
which payments were scheduled to begin in May
1951, was completely repaid in that same month.
By November, for the first time since the establish-
ment of the EPU, Germany had a credit balance
on its cumulative account. As a result of these
developments the German Government decided to
abolish, as of January 1, 1952, most of the quotas
imposed in February 1951 on imports from the
other Union members.
OUTLOOK
Despite the improvement in Germany's balance
of trade, the German monetary authorities have
decided to continue a cautious monetary policy
largely in order to protect the economy against
possible repercussions of international economic and
financial developments.
First, the foreign aid program of the United
States, which provided Germany with 428 million
dollars of free imports in 1951, was substantially
curtailed for the fiscal year 1951-52. Second, the
reliberalization of Germany's intra-European im-
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ports, which went into force on January 1, 1952,
might again increase imports, temporarily at least,
more rapidly than exports increase. This danger
has become more imminent since balance-of-pay-
ments difficulties have recently led the United
Kingdom and France to impose import restrictions
which may make it difficult for Germany to in-
crease or even to maintain its present level of exports
to those countries. Third, participation by Ger-
many in the defense effort of the free world might
increase Germany's import requirements and divert
potential exports to domestic defense needs. Finally,
increasing international tensions might again re-
sult in an increase in consumer demand which
would put pressure upon producers' imports for
increased domestic production. In the present
liquid position of German commercial banks, such
a demand could be made immediately effective by
a rapid expansion of credit.
On the other hand, Germany's foreign exchange
position has been strengthened by developments
since March 1951. Between February and Decem-
ber 1951 Germany not only repaid its EPU debt of
283 million dollars, but also increased its foreign
exchange holdings by the equivalent of 263 million.
On December 31, Germany's gold and foreign ex-
change reserves slightly exceeded the equivalent of
500 million dollars, and its EPU credit balance
and credit quota totaling 343 million were avail-
able for covering future intra-European trade
deficits. Germany is therefore better prepared today
to meet a temporary deficit in its balance of pay-
ments than it has been at any other time since the
end of the war.
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